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Abstract
Opinion Dynamics poses a novel technique to accurately locate the
patterns of an advanced attack against an industrial infrastructure, com-
pared to traditional intrusion detection systems. This distributed solu-
tion provides profitable information to identify the most affected areas
within the network, which can be leveraged to design and deploy tailored
response mechanisms that ensure the continuity of the service. In this
work, we base on this multi-agent collaborative approach to propose a re-
sponse technique that permits the secure delivery of messages across the
network. For such goal, our contribution is twofold: firstly, we redefine
the existing algorithm to assess not only the compromise of nodes, but
also the security and quality of service of communication links; secondly,
we develop a routing protocol that prioritizes the secure paths throughout
the topology considering the information obtained from the detection sys-
tem. Keywords: advanced, persistent, threat, opinion dynamics, quality,
service, routing, protocol.
1 Introduction
Today, most critical infrastructures of all industrial sectors (such as transport
or the Smart Grid) are controlled by SCADA systems (Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition), which access in real time to the devices that govern the
production chain. As far as cybersecurity is concerned, these devices have tradi-
tionally lacked protection, since industrial networks had to function in isolation
from other environments. However, there is currently a growing interconnection
of control systems with other networks (such as the Internet) for the outsourcing
of services or the storage of data, which is caused by the decrease in cost and
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standardization of hardware and software. As a result, there has also been a
growth of reported security threats, as industrial systems are now also victims
of the problems suffered by information technologies [1][2].
In this regard, the Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) represent the
most critical hazard in recent years. These are sophisticated attacks perpetrated
against a specific organization, where the attacker has considerable experience
and resources to penetrate the victim’s network, using a multitude of vulnera-
bilities and attack vectors [3]. They use stealthy techniques to go undetected
for a prolonged period of time, from the initial intrusion to the subsequent
propagation movements (a.k.a. lateral movements) within the APT life-cycle.
Stuxnet was the first APT reported (in 2010), although many others APTs have
appeared later, such as Duqu, DragonFly, BlackEnergy, and ExPetr [4].
Diverse security services must be applied to detect and deter the effects of
these threats and minimize the impact on the infrastructure, combining cutting-
edge technologies for accurately monitoring these threats. Traditional security
solutions like firewalls or antivirus software must be coupled with advanced ser-
vices (e.g., data loss prevention, advanced detection of malware, trusted com-
puting) and security awareness procedures to protect the industrial systems
from a holistic point of view, during their entire life-cycle. In this sense, In-
trusion Detection Systems (IDS) represent a first line of defense against the
wide range of cyber-threats leveraged by an APT. Numerous mechanisms have
been proposed in the industry and academia that make use of machine learn-
ing techniques [5] or propose advanced services that analyze the internal traffic
to detect specific attacks [6]. However, they only address security in precise
points of the infrastructure or they do not consider the persistence of attacks
over time. Consequently, there is still a need to find other defense solutions
that enable the traceability of APTs throughout the control network, beyond
the initial intrusion.
For this goal, authors in [7] propose a distributed consensus algorithm based
on Opinion Dynamics [8], making use of graph theory. They demonstrate the
feasibility of this novel approach to keep track of the anomalies suffered by de-
vices over the entire network, potentially caused by an APT. This information
can be used to put in place accurate mechanisms aiming to prevent the propa-
gation of the APT or to minimize their impact. However, the initial approach
from [7] does not take into account anomaly indicators concerning the Quality of
Service (QoS) of the communication links. As a consequence, it has limitations
in the monitoring of the network health and in the choice of countermeasures
to ensure best-possible connectivity in the presence of APT. The previously
proposed response technique for the maintenance of network paths does not
sufficiently apply to traditional industrial scenarios. By improving the original
approach we are able to design a more realistic response technique, showing the
effectiveness of the Opinion Dynamics to ensure the continuity of communica-
tions in the presence of an APT. More concretely, we present a routing protocol
that ensures the delivery of messages with a low probability of interception,
while ensuring a decent level of QoS, resulting in a combined approach. Our
contributions in this article can be summarized as follows:
• Improved Opinion Dynamics model based on anomaly indicators related
to the QoS of the communication links and the security of hosts.
• Enhanced routing approach for reliable connectivity in presence of APT
based on the improved Opinion Dynamics model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
the preliminary concepts related to the Quality of Service indicators used in
this work and the original APT-related anomaly detection approach based on
Opinion Dynamics. The improved approach based on QoS indicators is pro-
posed in Section 3 and the enhanced routing approach is presented in Section
4. Section 5 provides simulations and evaluation of our results. Section 6 draws
conclusions.
2 Preliminary concepts and related work
2.1 Quality of Service indicators for Routing Protocols
Critical infrastructures governed by industrial networks require to work at all
times, even in the presence of intruders; for this goal, we propose the use of
a routing protocol as a response technique that uses the security information
provided by a distributed detection system. However, in order to guarantee the
delivery performance, this protocol must also make resource reservation and
excise network control, in order to respond in a timely manner.
In traditional data networks, routing protocols simply use shortest path
algorithms for the path computation, based on a single metric like hop-count or
delay. In turn, QoS-aware routing protocols take into account further metrics
to addressing the Quality of Service, in particular [9][10]:
• Delay time. It measures the time taken to transfer data across the
network from one node to another. This value is often used to establish
allowance limits for the communication links, in order to select the fastest
route. In real-time operations, jitter or packet delay variations are used,
measured with a sliding window of fractions of seconds. This is due to
the dependence on the application (e.g., isolated environment of sensors,
Internet connection to the SCADA system) or the network congestion,
which could potentially slow down the communications.
• Bandwidth. It holds the maximum rate of data that can be transferred
from a source to a destination per time unit. In order for the industrial
devices to measure it, it is reasonable to determine the maximum band-
width available at a given time. However, the computation of this value
(along with delay) for routing purposes is a challenging problem since it
can frequently change, as well as delay [11]. Also, in presence of an APT,
there could not be any centralized control for allocating bandwidth among
the nodes. For this reason, most existing QoS-aware routing protocols in
the literature assume that the available bandwidth is known [12]. There
are some others that estimate this value with carrier-sense capability of
the underlying protocols (e.g., IEEE 802.11) to measure the idle and busy
time ratio, and then adding this information to the route control packets.
• Packet loss. Packet loss can be used to measure availability, which rep-
resents the probability that some recipient is reachable with the claimed
quality at a given moment of time. The packet loss is usually calculated
as the ratio of lost packets or dropped connections in connection-oriented
systems (e.g., upon retrieval of information from sensors).
Based on the set of adequate metrics, QoS-aware routing protocols per-
form resource estimation at each node and proceed with the route selection
[13][14][15]. Routes are usually chosen to maximize the available bandwidth
while minimizing the delay and the loss probability. However, finding a path
that simultaneously satisfies more than one constraint is a NP-Problem. For
this reason, heuristic approaches resulting in more efficient algorithms are often
used in the literature. For instance, [16] adopts three different criteria for the
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol [17]. Another efficient scalable heuristic
applied in [18] is based on Lagrangian relaxation. Another approach is based
on the shortest-widest path algorithm [19], where a path with maximum band-
width is found using a variant of the Dijkstra shortest-path algorithm and if
there exists more than one such path then the one with the lowest delay is
chosen.
Apart from these approaches, it is also possible to generate a single QoS
metric from multiple parameters of the communication links. For the sake of
simplicity and with the aim of aggregating different metrics (i.e., delay, band-
width, packet loss ratio) our approach utilizes the following QoS function [20]:
S(c) = B(c)
D(c)× L(c) (1)
where for a given communication link c, the metrics applied are the link’s band-
width B, delay D and packet loss L. Due to the reasons discussed before, the
estimation of these metrics at each node is out of the scope of this article.
The output of S(c), when evaluated for a given communication link, is di-
rectly proportional to the quality of service that it experiences. This information
can already be used for establishing a priority when selecting the routes along the
network. However, besides the QoS measures applied to communication links,
we will also introduce a security-based criterion for the selection of nodes that
are traversed by our routing protocol. This additional information is provided
by the Opinion Dynamics based detection system, explained in the following.
2.2 Using Opinion Dynamics for APT Detection
Compared to traditional defense solutions, Opinion Dynamics [8] has been
demonstrated to be a suitable technique for APT detection, as originally de-
scribed in [7]. In a later publication, its authors extend this work to enable the
traceability of attacks along their whole life-cycle by analyzing the movements
and anomalies suffered across the affected network [21].
From a general perspective, this distributed cooperative algorithm models
the behavior of a group of individuals in a society: each one (which we will refer
to as ’agent’) holds his/her own opinion, which is, to a certain extent, influenced
by the rest (and so does his/her opinion). After some time, the entire society is
fragmented into formed consensus of distinct spectra of opinions, belonging to
agents who are closer in their posture. Applied in the context of intrusion detec-
tion (with multiple of these agents deployed over the infrastructure), Opinion
Dynamics can help to identify the portions of the network which are subject
of an attack (and their criticality degree), by correlating the anomalies (subtle
or evident) sensed by agents. At the same time, it is possible to trace events
occurred in the network from the very first moment the intruder breaks in.
The formal description of the algorithm and how to apply consensus to this
particular context is explained in the following. Suppose a network architecture
given by the graph G(V,E), where V represents the set of devices within the
production chain (e.g., controllers, sensors or actuators) and E refers to the
communication links that connect these nodes. Let A be the set of agents such
that A = a1, a2, ..., an, being |A| = |V |. According to Opinion Dynamics, xi(t)
represents the individual opinion of agent ai in the iteration t, which can be
valued from zero to one (where one means the highest anomaly). To represent
the influence between agents, each agent i assigns a weight to each neighbor j,
which is denoted by wij . We assume that
∑n
k=1 wik = 1, in such a way that all
agents account for their own opinion.
Altogether, for a single execution of the algorithm at any given time of the
control system cycle, the formation of the new opinion for agent i in the next
iteration t+1 is described with this expression: xi(t+1) =
∑n
j=1 wijxj(t). This
formula models the opinion as a weighted average of the rest of agents’ opinions.
If we successively calculate this value for many iterations, different clusters of
opinions are formed when t tends to infinity, which can also be visualized in
a graph. Then, this information can be used to accurately identify different
attacked areas within the network, which are potentially monitored by large
sets of agents that exhibit the same anomaly pattern. The more affected areas
will be those which comprise a greater number of agents with a high opinion
value. At this point, in terms of adapting this multi-agent algorithm to our
particular scenario, two questions appear:
1) The representation of the initial opinion xi(0) for every agent i,
that in practice holds the degree of anomaly detected by them. Authors of the
original publication [7] arbitrarily select a set of hierarchically connected nodes
within the network that play the role of agents to perform the detection; then,
they model their initial opinion by computing the deviation in the betweenness
centrality score [22] with respect to its value in normal conditions. This indicator
holds the level of connectivity that every node within the topology experiences.
However, as it will be analyzed later in Section 3 and mentioned in [21], Opinion
Dynamics is open to include new anomaly indicators that serve as an input to
agents. In our case, we are interested in representing anomalies caused by the
compromise of both devices and communication links.
2) The representation of the weight given by each agent to its re-
spective neighbors, in order to consider their influence on the opinion about
the severity of the incidence detected. The original approach is based on a simple
criterion to choose the weight assigned among agents: the closer two opinions of
two connected nodes are (their values), the higher the weight assigned between
them will be. This means that, for every agent, the weight given to its neigh-
bors is uniformly divided into those agents whose opinion is very similar to its
own, considering an ε threshold for the difference between both values. Intu-
itively, this simulates the fact that agents located nearby with the same degree
of anomaly sensed are prone to detect the same threat in their surroundings.
Again, although this may be a valid criterion to model the weight, it could be
enhanced to realistically reflect other environmental conditions involved (e.g.,
Quality of Service), as discussed in Section 3.
After assessing the security of the network with Opinion Dynamics, we can
use this information to execute defense procedures. Authors in [7] leverage a
simple message routing algorithm to ensure the reachability of nodes in presence
of an attack. However, more techniques can be combined and deployed dynam-
ically, either proactive (e.g., placing honeypots over the affected zones to gain
knowledge from the adversary or using redundancy of links between agents) or
reactive (e.g., recovery of nodes or links to reduce the impact on the infrastruc-
ture). In this sense, a potential study could be conducted to find an effective
defense strategy (e.g., through specific validation approaches like game theory).
In this paper, we show the weaknesses of the original proposal and illustrate the
utility of the detection with an alternative solution that addresses those issues.
This will be described later in Section 4.
3 Modified Opinion Dynamics approach: anal-
ysis of communication links
As argued in Section 2.2, the original approach based on Opinion Dynamics for
the APT detection [7] requires further improvement. First, the aforementioned
approach only focuses on the detection of topological changes over a graph-
defined network, where a subset of nodes of V (called the Dominating Set) are
in charge of exchanging their opinions, which are represented with the ratio
of change in their betweenness centrality indicator. Accordingly, the attacker
model just contemplates the compromise of nodes to perform a removal of links.
Even though this is valid to show the applicability of the algorithm using graph
theory, we must go beyond and come up with different ways to model such
opinion value in a real industrial ecosystem. The reason is that APTs comprise
a wide range of attack vectors besides the mere denial of service, which pose a
source of different anomalies (mostly subtle), that are potentially measured and
correlated by the agent associated with the affected node. Therefore, the aim is
to realistically analyze the security state of each node and its neighborhood, in
order to create a quantitative value that would serve as an input to the Opinion
Dynamics. In general, two (possibly simultaneous) approaches can be suggested
for this task:
• Use an IDS to retrieve events and alerts based on which the security state
of the node in question can be analyzed. This may also include events
triggered by vulnerability scanners or antivirus software.
• Analyse the incoming and outgoing network traffic and perform compari-
son with the normal behavior, for example, by applying machine learning
techniques and assessing anomalies with regard to the traffic volume, de-
lays, network connections and protocols used.
With this, we assume that the agent would have enough input data to com-
pute a single opinion value for the security state of its monitored device. At this
point, the effectiveness from the use of specific ways to derive such value could
be compared, which would strongly depend on the actual network setup (e.g.,
topology, technologies, communication protocols) and it is not in the scope of
this paper; instead, we point out that the novelty and effectiveness of the Opin-
ion Dynamics approach resides in the ability to correlate anomalies throughout
the network and thereby get insight into the location and severity of attacks; the
way to uptake the individual anomaly detection is customizable and reliant on
the security scenario that we want to achieve, thereby working as a framework.
One related issue is the implementation of this mechanism in an industrial
infrastructure. As discussed in [21], these agents can be either logical or physical.
On the one hand, we can assume that the status of individual devices can be
retrieved from a centralized entity, which consists of a computationally powerful
node in charge of correlating the anomalies from all agents. Ideally, this node
would then apply protection measures (e.g., honeypots, data recovery, backup
servers) based on the security state of the network. In practice, this can be easily
implemented by using switches in port-mirroring mode, so that all traffic from
the nodes is relayed to a central correlator system, for instance. On the other
hand, we could also consider that these agents can be physically deployed over
the network, in form of monitoring devices or integrated with the software of the
industrial assets. However, this option is not as feasible, since manufacturers
and operators of critical infrastructures are reluctant to introduce modifications
in their hardware and software (mainly due to computational limitations and
use of privative software).
Regardless of the method used for the anomaly detection, we especially look
into the security of the opinion exchange in this paper. In this regard, the
original approach does not provide details about how the agents transfer their
opinions between them or to a central correlator. If the same communication
channels are used to deliver the Opinion Dynamics values, we must prevent
against an attacker being able to compromise these links and potentially forge
malicious opinions. At the same time, besides assessing the security of each
node, the algorithm should also take the QoS of the communication links into
consideration to safely send this information, as well as to route other messages
(e.g., commands or data) between the devices. In the following, we propose a
modification of the weight calculation mechanism to consider the QoS of the
communication links and the confidence assigned to neighbors for the opinion
transmission. This poses a solution to the second issue raised in Section 2.2.
To begin with, let’s consider the original model: each agent i determines the
weight given to every neighbor j in its neighborhood Ni through this expression:
wij = 1/N
′
i (2)
where N ′i is the subset of neighbors of Ni, whose difference in opinion with
agent i is below ε. Otherwise, wij becomes zero. Even though this is just a cri-
terion to reflect the degree of similitude between agents, it lacks much accuracy
since it leaves behind several other aspects involved; in this case, we want to
introduce an additional factor to regulate this weight through considering the
QoS of the channel in the neighborhood.
Let S : E → R be a function that assigns QoS scores to communication links
in the network defined by G(V,E), as presented in Section 2.1. The higher the
score of S for a given link is, the more QoS it provides. For a given i, we aim to
fairly distribute wij by giving a higher value to those agents j whose S(eij) is
greater, where eij ∈ E represents the bidirectional communication link between
i and j. This methodology complies with the following three conditions:
• C1. The sum of weights given by agent i to the neighbors in N ′i must be
1, also considering threshold ε.
∑N ′i
j=1 wij = 1.
• C2. The own agent i must have a sensitive fixed weight assigned to itself.
For instance, we can assume wii = 0.5; the reason is that it is not fair that
it associates a higher level of confidence to any other agent, whose link of
communication can be minimally compromised.
• C3. The rest of weight (1/2 in this case) assigned by agent i is distributed
among neighbors in N ′i proportionally to the quality of their communica-
tion links. If we define q =
∑N ′i
j S(eij), then the resulting weight value is
defined by wij = (1− wii) ∗ S(eij)/q.
Example. Table in Figure 1 shows the calculation of wij for the node C in the
example graph (where i = C) following the proposed methodology, compared to
the original one. The weight value that is computed using the new methodology
is denoted by w′ij . In both cases, a value of ε = 0.35 has been considered. As
we can see, the new distribution of weight results more equitable, where node
C assigns a higher weight to nodes A and D, since their links show a better
quality and security (which is represented by the S(eCj) column).
BFE
A
D
C
j xj(0) S(eCj) wCj w′Cj
A 0 0.9 0.25 0.26
B 0.6 0.8 0 0
C 0.22 0.55 0.25 0.5
D 0.5 0.75 0,25 0.21
E 0.12 0.1 0.25 0.03
F 0.9 0.2 0 0
Figure 1: Example of weight calculation by agent C
4 QoS-Aware Routing based on Opinion Dynam-
ics
In response to an APT, the combined opinions determined by the monitoring
agents on the industrial network with regard to the security of its nodes and the
QoS aspects of their communication links can subsequently be used to enhance
network routing. Here we present a novel approach aiming to enhance routing
algorithms used in industrial networks such that the probability of packets being
intercepted by potentially compromised network nodes is minimized while the
Quality of Service of paths through which these packets are routed is maximized.
This way, we can ensure the confidentiality and reliability of the network until
the threat is completely eradicated from the infrastructure.
Note that our approach can also replace the initial response mechanism pro-
posed in [7] which aims to enhance delivery of messages in presence of APT
by relying on a redundant non-compromised part of the network topology and
using secret sharing to split packets into chunks that are randomly dispatched
over multiple paths. Their approach has a number of shortcomings as discussed
in the following. First, their attack model is based on a complete removal of
communication links by compromised nodes and does not consider a more re-
alistic scenario where such links may experience varying QoS levels as a result
of an attack. As observed in the recent years, many APT usually rely on zero-
day vulnerabilities and make use of stealthy techniques to go unnoticed for a
prolonged period of time, until they finally exfiltrate information or destroy the
physical equipment. Therefore, it is necessary to consider a more subtle be-
havior of the attacker who may not wish to fully disrupt the communication
and be detected. Second, the assumption on the existence of a redundant non-
compromised topology in industrial control networks is not realistic. The archi-
tecture of such networks very frequently responds to a fixed configuration where
all resources are rigidly connected with each other and so installation of a sep-
arate network topology might require significant investment and modifications
of existing hardware devices. Third, their approach relies on the shortest-path
estimation for which sending network nodes are assumed to know the entire
network topology and has therefore limitations when used in combination with
existing routing protocols that may not require nodes to have this knowledge.
Our approach is more general and realistic in that it aims at enhancing avail-
able routing algorithms to take into account the anomalies determined by the
monitoring agents for the QoS levels of communication links and the security of
network nodes when making routing decisions rather than selecting an optimal
route based on the shortest path only. In order to set the background for our
approach, we consider a typical architecture of an industrial network following
the ISA-95 standard [23]. In practice, due to the modernization of industrial
technologies in recent years, these networks have evolved towards a more dis-
tributed model. Control devices (i.e., PLCs or RTUs) govern the production
cycle by retrieving data from field devices (i.e., sensors and actuators), accord-
ing to the information exchanged with SCADA systems. These are evolving
towards cloud-based solutions, that interconnect other services within the orga-
nization. This way, we see how the network is divided into two main sections:
the industrial assets (which we will refer to as ’operational technologies’, OT)
and the IT (Information Technologies). This is the base that authors assume to
extend the topology used in [7], used now to show the feasibility of our routing
protocol.
Let G(E, V ) be a graph that describes the overall network topology. This
graph is composed of the two subgraphs G(VIT , EIT ) and G(VOT , EOT ), which
are interconnected by a set of intermediate firewalls VFW so that V = VIT ∪
VOT ∪ VFW . More specifically, both are joined by the firewalls VFW , that have
connections with the nodes of VIT and VOT that belong to the Power Dominating
Set (PDS) of those subnetworks. This concept refers to a set of hierarchically
selected nodes that have the maximum dominance over the entire network [24].
With respect to the network topology, we note that each of these subnetworks
has a different configuration. On the one hand, G(VOT , EOT ) follows a power-
law distribution of the type y ∝ x−α [25], which models the hierarchical topology
of an electric power grid and its high-level substations, which are subsequently
connected to nodes with less connectivity (e.g., sensors and actuators). On the
other hand, G(VIT , EIT ) presents a small-world distribution, that models the
traditional topology of TCP/IP networks on the Internet [26].
Over this distribution of nodes, there are two types of communication flows:
information about the production chain delivered from the lower layers to the
managerial IT network and, in reverse way, control commands issued from that
section (e.g., the SCADA system) to the industrial process. For both types of
the communication flows we base our approach on the Bellman-Ford algorithm
[27] that is at the core of the Distance Vector Routing (DVR) [28] protocol,
which determines the path to remote nodes using hop count as a metric. Each
node holds a table that contains the distance to each node and the next hop
in the route. This information is exchanged periodically with the neighbors,
to ultimately compute the path using the Bellman-Ford algorithm. This con-
trasts to the Dijkstra’s path-finding algorithm [29] used in [7], that finds the
shortest path by requiring all nodes to have overall knowledge of the network
topology and is at the core of the Link-State Routing (LSR) protocol [30]. In
this protocol routers periodically flood the entire network to ensure that each
node holds a synchronized copy of the routing table. By choosing DVR over
LSR we can compute paths locally without involvement centralized routers as
communicating with such nodes in presence of APT would impose additional
risks.
The Bellman-Ford algorithm uses a weighted directed graph G(V,E). The
shortest distance from a node to the rest is determined by overestimating the
true distance, following the principle of relaxation. In our case, since we want to
prioritize QoS and security for the chosen path over the distance, we represent
the weight assigned to each link eij ∈ E as
W (eij) =
Xt(j)
S(eij)
(3)
where Xt(j) is the final anomaly value of node j after executing the Opinion
Dynamics as specified in Section 3. We select j instead of i since we want to
prevent the messages against propagating to a node that is potentially compro-
mised. On the other hand, S(eij) refers to the QoS score of the communication
channel eij , as specified in Section 2.1. The higher the anomaly sensed by the
agent in node j is, the greater the weight assigned to that link will be. Corre-
spondingly, the S score is inversely proportional to that value. By this means,
we take into consideration the security of devices and the Quality of Service of
their links when deploying our response technique in form of routing protocol.
Such DVR-based routing approach can be executed at any time of the pro-
duction chain, paired with a previous execution of the Opinion Dynamics algo-
rithm for adapting the network to the current security level, thereby achieving
resilience. Therefore, we assume the process to update the routes can be ex-
ecuted as frequently as the security scenario imposes, which would not imply
additional computing costs for the devices if we consider that the detection al-
gorithm is executed in a central correlator system separated from the industrial
network, as suggested in [7]. In the following, we prove the effectiveness of our
technique by simulating successive attacks against a network. Note that this
approach can be validated in the future with game theory to consider dynamic
attack behaviors and additional defense solutions.
5 Simulation and evaluation
In this section, our primary aim is to prove that the proposed QoS-aware routing
approach based on Opinion Dynamics can effectively minimize the interception
of messages, avoiding paths that contain compromised nodes while ensuring
an acceptable level of quality. First, we define the attack model used in our
simulation that determines how the anomalies are generated over the network
and measured by the agents. Then, we execute the technique (i.e., the delivery
of messages and the QoS analysis) with different parametrization of the topology
and attacks performed. Finally, we evaluate the simulation findings.
5.1 Attack model: simulation of attacks and anomalies
In order to define a more realistic attack model for our response technique, we
assume an attacker can break into the infrastructure by leveraging zero-day
vulnerabilities and then use stealthy techniques to propagate over the network,
until information is filtered or disruption to the infrastructure is caused.
Therefore, contrary to the approach based on the alteration of links, we
consider an attack model based on a succession of lateral movements over the
network nodes, aiming to infect as many devices as possible so that the security
when delivering messages is jeopardized. Let attackSet be this sorted set of
attack stages that an APT can perform against the industrial network, which is
defined by G(V,E) and is composed by the IT and OT sections, as explained in
Section 4. This set comprises a finite number of elements of the following kind:
• attackITnode: the adversary initializes the APT or propagates the at-
tack to a device in the IT subnetwork.
• attackFWnode: the attacker compromises a firewall (when the previ-
ously compromised node has connection with it), in order to propagate to
the other section of the control network.
• attackOTnode: the intruder compromises a node in the industrial sec-
tion of the network.
Every time the attacker takes over a new device, two main variables change:
1. From the security perspective, the agent associated with the compro-
mised node notices an increase in the anomaly level, that ranges from
zero to one, as described before. If we define x as the initial opinion
vector for all agents, then xti is updated in the simulation after attack
number t. For simplicity, we assign a value that is randomly generated
according to a uniform distribution over (0, 1), simulating the existence of
both subtle and evident anomalies.
2. From the perspective of Quality of Service, the agent also senses a
potential alteration in the QoS experienced in the incoming or outgoing
connections, as a consequence of the attack. The value of S(eik) for all
eik ∈ E in the simulations is originally chosen from a uniform distribution
over (0, 1), to represent the presence of channels with different QoS levels.
In the event of an attack, the value of S(eik) and S(eki) scores decreases
(being zero the minimum), where i is the attacked node and k refers to
all neighbors of i such that there exists eik ∈ E (since each connection
is bidirectional). This decrease is represented by δ. Since the attacker
can leverage stealthy techniques to go unnoticed without affecting the
communications, this value is also chosen uniformly at random from (0, 1).
Algorithm 1 describes the proposed APT life cycle. For all the attack stages
in the provided attackSet parameter, the security of agents and the QoS score of
Algorithm 1 APT life cycle
output: X representing the final opinion value for all agents, S representing the QoS
scores of links
local: Graph G(V,E) representing the network, where V = VIT ∪ VOT ∪ VFW
input: attackSet← attackStageAPTx , representing the APT chain of attacks
x← zeros(|V |) (initial opinion vector)
{attack ← first attack from attackSet}
while attackSet 6=  do
x(attackNode)← U(0, 1), δ ← U(0, 1)
for neighbour in neighbours(attackNode) do
S(attackNode, neighbour)← S(attackNode, neighbour)− δ
S(neighbour, attackNode)← S(neighbour, attackNode)− δ
end for
X ← ComputeOpinionDynamics(x, S)
attackSet← attackSet \ attack
end while
the links is reevaluated, as described before: firstly, the attacked node (specified
with attackNode) is assigned with a random value of anomaly (i.e., the opinion
of its agent) in the uniform (0,1) distribution. Then, each of its ingoing and
outgoing links are updated with a diminished QoS score, according to the value
of δ. Afterwards, Opinion Dynamics is executed to aggregate all opinions and
calculate their final values, which eases the identification of zones under the
effect of the APT following the algorithm explained in Section 3. Finally, this
information can be input to the routing protocol.
5.2 Reliable message delivery
Once the attack model has been defined, we can execute the defender’s code
based on the routing protocol in presence of an APT to firstly show that mes-
sages are successfully delivered in a way that the probability of traversing a
compromised node (i.e., with an opinion value greater than zero) is lower than
using the previously proposed approach in [7]. To simulate this, a set of 100
different messages are randomly generated, whose sender and recipient belong
to the graph G(V,E), making sure that more than one path exists between
both nodes. Half of these messages are control commands (i.e., sent from the
IT section to one device in the lowest levels of the infrastructure), while the
other half are data packets, generated in the production chain and dispatched
to the IT subnetwork. Therefore, messages are delivered in both ways based on
the industrial topology defined in Section 4.
In order to compare the level of security experienced by the response tech-
nique and consequently compare it with other solutions, we define the com-
promise level indicator for each of the messages sent. This holds the sum of
anomaly values (i.e., opinions calculated with the Opinion Dynamics algorithm,
represented with X in Algorithm 1), which are measured by the set of nodes
that compose the path described by the message, in the route from the recipient
to the destination. The greater this value is, the highest probability for the mes-
sage to be intercepted will be. For a given number N of messages transmitted,
we can determine the average compromise level as∑N
i=1
∑|R|
j=1Xj
N
(4)
where Xj is the opinion of agent j, 1 ≤ j ≤ |R|, and R is the set of nodes
that each message i traverses. This overall value is calculated for our cus-
tom routing protocol and will be compared with two other approaches: on the
one hand, (a) the previously proposed mechanism in [7], that is based
on the Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm, without considering the opinions of
the agents; on the other hand, (b) the Dijkstra’s path-finding algorithm
parametrized with the opinion of agents as weights for the search of the
optimal path (i.e., the route with a minimal compromise level). In other words,
for the computation of the path from sender to recipient in G(V,E), (a) uses
a weighting function W for each edge eij ∈ such that W (eij) = 1 if eij simply
exists (so that the destination is reached in the minimum number of hops). As
for (b), W (eij) = Xj , hence prioritizing not to hop to a compromised node. Our
aim is to show how (c) our approach based on Bellman-Ford algorithm,
that uses the weighting function defined in Equation 3, achieves better security
(i.e., the value of compromise level) than (a), with closer results to (b).
In this experiment (carried out in Matlab), we have generated a random
industrial network of 50, 100 and 200 nodes following the topology described in
Section 4 (where the two halves of nodes are respectively used for the IT and
OT subnetworks and an extra firewall node is used to merge them). Over these
topologies, we have simulated the effect of an APT (according to algorithm 1)
composed by 50, 100 and 200 attack actions, respectively. We have represented
the overall behavior of Stuxnet (since it is one of the most documented attacks)
at a basic level: the APT begins by compromising one node from the IT net-
work (originally using malicious USB flash drives) and then spreads through the
entire subnetwork until it finally breaks into the OT section, where the threat
propagates until it infects the target device (the uranium enriching centrifuges).
By making sure the number of attacks reaches the number of nodes, we
represent the most critical scenario when the APT takes over the entire network,
thereby showing the effectiveness of the algorithm at all times (although this
validation process could be further optimized if attacker and defender were part
of a dynamically confronted competition with specific action rules, by means
of game theory). After each attack phase, the Opinion Dynamics algorithm is
executed and the set of 100 random messages are delivered, putting into play the
three aforementioned routing algorithms. Finally, the average of compromise is
calculated. The plot in Figure 2 shows the evolution of this value over the entire
set of attacks for the three assessed solutions.
As we can see, the Dijkstra’s algorithm that uses the opinion of agents as
weights to compute the path serves as the baseline of the minimum compromise
level that can be achieved. However, our approach based on Bellman-Ford algo-
rithm presents a similar result with a slight increment of anomaly experienced,
that still remains far from the high value experienced by the Dijkstra’s scheme
proposed in [7], as we wanted to demonstrate. We will now prove that our
approach also provides better Quality of Service requirements.
5.3 Quality of Service experienced
After analyzing how our solution effectively experiences a lower level of com-
promise when routing the messages, it is also necessary to prove that the paths
generated by the protocol also achieve an adequate Quality of Service, which
is the main contribution of this paper. This would ensure a fast and reliable
communication, especially necessary when the computed paths impose several
hops to reach the recipient as a consequence of avoiding the effect of the attack.
Following the previous methodology, we aim to deliver a set of 100 messages
over the graph G(V,E) in such a way that the number of hops is minimized
and the Quality of Service experienced is maximized. This time, we define the
QoS level indicator for each message sent as the sum of individual QoS scores
for all the successive edges that belong to the path (as explained in Section 2.1)
divided by the number of hops that this message performs. The greater this
value is, the better quality of service with a lower number of nodes traversed
will be. Given N messages transmitted, we can determine the average QoS level
as
∑N
i=1
∑|R|
j=1 S(e
j)
hopsi
N
(5)
where S is the QoS score function from Equation 1, ej refers to edges from
the route R which is taken by message i, and hopsi is the number of intermediate
hops. This average QoS value is calculated for our routing approach in presence
of APT using the same topology and attack scenarios as in the previous test
case, and is compared with the two other approaches: (a) the previously
proposed mechanism in [7], that is based on the Dijkstra’s shortest-path
algorithm without accounting for any QoS implications; and (b) the Dijkstra’s
path-finding algorithm parametrized with the QoS score of the edges
as weights for the search of the optimal path (i.e., the route with a maximum
quality). Thus, (a) uses an W weighting function for each edge eij such that
W (eij) = 1 if eij simply exists, while in (b) it uses W (eij) = 1/S(eij), hence
prioritizing the path with maximum Quality of Service. In this case, our aim
is now to show how (c) our approach based on Bellman-Ford algorithm,
that uses the weighting function defined in Equation 3, achieves a better QoS
level than (a), with closer results to (b).
The plot in Figure 3 represents the evolution in the average QoS levels.
As the previous test case, the QoS-aware Distance Vector Routing presents a
QoS level per hop ratio similar to the Dijkstra’s algorithm weighted with the
QoS scores. As we can see, the three routing approaches have their QoS levels
diminished as the APT evolves (due to the attacks and consequent decrease of
the S scores, as explained in Algorithm 1), but our approach shows a higher QoS
level, close to the one experienced by the optimal Dijkstra’s solution. Therefore,
we have demonstrated our reliable routing approach behaves in a nearly optimal
way, more efficiently than the original response technique [7]. Figures 2 and 3
prove that QoS- or security anomaly-based routing alone are not sufficient, since
both criteria must be complied to ensure a delivery of messages balanced with
a decent level of security and QoS. In addition, table-driven routing algorithms
like DVR with the Bellman-Ford algorithm also ensure an ad-hoc selection of
routes without any central entities involved in the communications, which can
help achieving a higher level of security while alleviating the large amount of
traffic that route updates like the original protocol can imply.
6 Conclusions and future work
Nowadays, APTs impose a major problem for the security of Industrial Con-
trol Networks, for which the Opinion Dynamics approach has been shown to
represent a promising solution. In this work, we have revisited the original
approach to analyze its applicability and enhance the algorithm with the aim
of enabling reliable communications. We have defined an aggregated Quality
of Service score that permits to prioritize the opinions of agents transmitted
through trustworthy links and made the detection system account for anoma-
lies in the communication channels besides anomalies sensed on the nodes. We
have further developed an alternative routing approach that uses the anomaly
information measured by the agents in relation to the security of nodes and the
QoS indicators of the communication links to choose paths with an almost op-
timal degree of security and QoS. Finally, the superiority of our approach over
prior work has been demonstrated with an extended attack model and simula-
tions using modern industrial network topologies. Our ongoing work involves
defining an extended set of response solutions coupled with a more realistic at-
tack model, with the aim of finding an adaptable defensive strategy using game
theory. This is being addressed in TI&TO, a two-player game where the de-
fender leverages multiple protection measures based on the Opinion Dynamics
detection approach.
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Figure 2: Average compromise level
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Figure 3: Average QoS level
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